Item BRINK OF APOCALYPSE 4/1 - Interview with Robert M. Gates, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, 1983, [2007]

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BRINK OF APOCALYPSE 4/1

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Interview with Robert M. Gates, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, 1983, [2007]

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  • [2007] (Creation)

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1 file

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Typescript transcript, , of interview with Robert M. Gates CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, 1983. Subjects include his role as head of analytical research in CIA and his role as chairman of the National Intelligence Council in 1983; relationship between CIA and President Ronald Reagan; how intelligence was gathered then passed on from the CIA to the administration; the role of propaganda from the CIA perspective; his recollection of the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight KAL 007 and discrepancies in the information received; whether the shooting down was intentional or not; the role of spin; increased tensions between USSR and the USA, Strategic Defence Initiative and Star Wars; killing of American military attaché in East Germany; “Evil Empire” speech by Reagan; unstable USSR leadership due to the elderly General Secretaries, Leonid Brezhnev (1969-1982), Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985); the role of Western medicine and doctors in treating the General Secretaries’ illnesses; USSR leadership knowledge of the West, based on experiences of the leaders; discrepancies between what the Politburo knew and what Andropov knew; CIA awareness of Operation RYAN; the relationship between MI6 and CIA in passing on Operation RYAN intelligence to each other; relationship between Dmitriy Ustinov,Minister of Defence for the USSR 1976-1984, and Andropov; Politburo’s role within the Communist Party; Andropov’s kidney problems and Western awareness of them by intelligence gathering; lack of intelligence analysis capability by the KGB; Beirut barracks bombing, 23 Oct 1983 and US military vulnerability; intelligence community’s lack of involvement in Able Archer (Nov 1983), monitoring of USSR response to Able Archer; USSR’s combat readiness during Able Archer; comparisons between Able Archer and Cuban Missile Crisis; concerns about Moscow reaction to Able Archer; Moscow’s response to lack of activity; United States underestimating the levels of USSR paranoia. 58pp

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