Item COLD WAR 27/71 - Transcript of interview with military intelligence officer William K Lee, 1996

Typescript transcript of interview with William K Lee, Senior Executive Officer, Military Production Division, US Intelligence Agency, 1960-[1970], relating to the differences in US defense policy during the administrations of US President Dwight David Eisenhower, 1953-1961, and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1961-1963; the US nuclear doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), 1967; the 'missile gap', a US perception of the advantage held by the Soviets in the production of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), [1958]-1960; the US use of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) piloted Lockheed U2 high altitude photographic reconnaissance aircraft in missions over the USSR to search for Soviet ICBM silos, 1956-1960; the shooting down, near Sverdlovsk, USSR, of a CIA Lockheed U2 high altitude photographic reconnaissance aircraft, and the capture of the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, May 1960; the Soviet deception programme to exaggerate the number of ICBMs deployed, 1957-1961; the Soviet deployment of SS-6 'Sapwood', SS-7 and SS-8 'Sasin' ICBMs, 1957-[1963]; the US nuclear doctrine of counterforce, emphasising limited nuclear strikes against an enemy's armed forces and not against civilian populations, 1962; US perceptions of the USSR, [1960-1965]; the belief amongst the US intelligence community that the USA was responsible for the Cold War, [1960-1965]; the effect of the US/Soviet arms race on the living standard of the Soviet population, [1945-1990]; the bankruptcy of the USSR due to excessive defence spending, [1988]; Soviet nuclear strategy, 1949-1990; the perceived threat of a Soviet nuclear first strike against the USA, [1960-1969]; the US and Soviet development of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs); the summit meeting between US President Lyndon Baines Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin, Glassboro, New Jersey, USA, Jun 1967; the US and Soviet development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); the US reaction to the Chinese detonation of their first atomic bomb, Lop Nor, People's Republic of China, Oct 1964, and to the testing of their first Hydrogen bomb, Lop Nor, Jun 1967; the US 'Safeguard' (previously known as 'Sentinel') anti ballistic missile (ABM) defence programme, consisting of Nike X XLIM-49A Spartan and Sprint interceptor missiles, [1969-1970]; the omission of discussions on the limitation of MIRVs during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 1969-1972; the role of US intelligence services during the Cold War, 1945-1990; Lee's opinion of Robert Strange McNamara, US Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968; the USSR reaching parity with the USA in the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons deployed, 1969. 39pp