Typescript transcript of interview with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Director, Office of Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, US Department of State, 1952-1969, Senior Staff Member, US National Security Council, 1969-1974, Counsellor, US Department of State, 1974-1977, and Guest Scholar, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, USA, [1996], relating to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 1969-1972; the US strategic policy of flexible response, 1961; the summit meeting between US President Lyndon Baines Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin, Glassboro, New Jersey, USA, Jun 1967; the US and Soviet development of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs); the omission of discussions on the limitation of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 1969-1972; the increase in the number of US and Soviet nuclear warheads deployed following the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), 1972; the relationship between the US and Soviet negotiating teams during SALT, 1969-1972; the difficulty in translating complex technical terminology into understandable Russian and English, SALT, 1969-1972; the importance of the 'back channel' negotiations between Dr Henry (Alfred) Kissinger, US National Security Adviser, 1969-1972, and Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA, 1962-1986, during SALT, 1969-1972; the role of Kissinger during SALT, 1969-1972; the policy of détente between the USA and the USSR, 1969-1975. 27pp