The US Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968 microfilm collection presents an integrated record of US decision making relating to the development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, 1955-1968. Documents are generated from a number of sources including the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Air Force, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Strategic Air Command, the Executive Office of the President, US National Security Council, and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Material relating to early US policy planning and decisions on thermonuclear weapons includes relevance studies by the RAND Corporation, a US non-partisan government policy guidance institution, 1952; memoranda from the Office of the White House relating to nuclear weapons stockpiles and projections, 1959; and, memoranda from the US Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission relating to underground and atmospheric nuclear testing, 1959-62. Papers relating to nuclear weapons development, acquisition and testing include memoranda from Gen Curtis E LeMay, Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Air Command, relating to increased budgetary needs for the proposed nuclear build-up, Jan 1956; memorandum from Gen Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, Defense Liaison Officer and Staff Secretary to the President, relating to the concept of 'massive retaliation' in the event of a Soviet first-strike, May 1956; memorandum from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to emergency war plans, nuclear strategy, and preventive war, Sep 1956; memorandum from the Gen Lyman L Lemnitzer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to US doctrine on thermonuclear attack, Apr 1961; memorandum from the US Department of Defense to President John Fitzgerald Kennedy relating to scenarios for US and Soviet first-strikes, Oct 1961; memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara to the Office of the Secretary, US Army, relating to nuclear damage limitation and 'assured destruction'. Papers relating to nuclear strategy and planning include memoranda concerning the applicability of Soviet cities as targets of US nuclear attack; the US Strategic Air Command Basic War Plan, [Feb 1960]; papers relating to target co-ordination and planning for a functional Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 1960-1961; papers on 'war-gaming', net evaluation exercises of US capabilites in the event of a general nuclear war with the Soviet Union, including memoranda from Robert R Bowie, Director of US State Department Policy Planning Staff, concerning Soviet capabilities to inflict direct damage on the US, 1953-1967. Material relating to air, land and sea nuclear delivery systems, missile deployments, alert programs, and defence appropriations include memoranda from Goodpaster concerning Eisenhower's endorsement plans for missile program acceleration and for upgrading US Strategic Air Command capabilities, 1957; memoranda from the President's Science Advisory Committee relating to the construction of civil defence structures and missile deployments, 1958; report from the US Department of Defense, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, reviewing US weapons systems and directly-related functions which constitute the strategic offensive posture of the US 1964-1967; press statements and memoranda from US Secretary of Defence McNamara relating to the doctine of 'assured destruction', defence appropriations, and weapons development, 1961-66; US National Security Briefings on strategic intelligence, Soviet capabilities for strategic attack, anti-missile and air defence, and economic trends, 1963. Papers relating to nuclear strategy, planning, weapons and delivery systems in the European theatre include reports regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's strategy for nuclear war, 1954-1969; the deployment of Chrysler 'Jupiter' PGM-19 IRBMs in Western Europe; the establishment of the Douglas 'Thor' PGM-17 IRBM program in Great Britain, 1956-1963; the escalation of US-Soviet hostilies in Berlin, 1961; reports concerning British co-operation with with US Strategic Air Command; speech by US Secretary of State McNamara, in Athens, Greece, relating to US assurances to its European allies in the event of a general war, 1962. Papers relating to nuclear warning and defence include reports from the US Department of State concerning the immediate construction of a Distant Early Warning (DEW) system in Canada and Alaska, 1952-1953; reports from the President's Science Advisory Committee, including studies of civil defence measures in the event of a nuclear attack, 1957-1958; reports from the US Department of State regarding the construction of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) in the United Kingdom, 1958; memoranda from the North American Aerospace Command (NORAD), relating to nuclear pre- emption and tactical warnings, 1958-1959; reports from the President's Science Advisory Committee's Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Panel, 1958-1959; papers from the President's Science Advisory Committee and the US Department of Defense relating to the construction and deployment of Bell Laboratory Nike-Zeus and Nike X Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs) in the US, Canada, and Western Europe, 1959-1968.

Microfilm copies of official US government reports and US military, scientific, academic and policy journals relating to nuclear weapons, arms control, weapons technology, deterrence, nuclear strategy, and US foreign policy, 1919-1995. The reports have been arranged chronologically and include material relating to non-proliferation treaty safeguards; civil defence in the United States; deterrence theory; analyses of the Soviet Military Industrial Complex; interview transcripts of US government officials associated with weapons systems development and deployment; qualitative and quantitative analyses of the US-Soviet arms race; analyses of the theory of flexible response; nuclear capabilities of the People's Republic of China; North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) missile warning systems, 1968-1981; the Joint Cruise Missiles Project, 1982; the Tonopah Test Range technical manual, 1982; the planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) nuclear deterrent for the 1980s and 1990s; French and British nuclear forces in the 1980s and 1990s; the evolution of US and NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and limited nuclear war options, the Strategic Defense Initiative Program (SDI); trends in anti-nuclear protests in the US; US National Security Policy, 1980s; the threat of nuclear terrorism; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; anti-satellite weaponry; the threat of biological and chemical weapons. Official US government reports include report to the US Congress relating to stockpile reliability, weapons re-manufacture, and the role of nuclear testing, 1987; report to the US Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1989; Nevada Test Site Annual Site Environmental Report, 1989; report on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), including the text of the treaty and a number of related documents and protocols, 1991; the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 1993; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report to the US Congress, 1994; US Department of Energy reports relating to the disposal and storage of fissile materials, 1995.

War Cabinet Minutes (HMSO), 1939-1945 is a themed microfiche collection containing copies of the minutes of the War Cabinet Meetings, Sep 1939-Jul 1945, and Cabinet Conclusions and Confidential Annexes, 1941-1945. Meeting minutes include British plans to create discord amongst the German High Command, Nov 1939; criticism of the military campaign in Norway, May 1940; First Lord of the Admiralty Winston (Leonard Spencer) Churchill's criticism of the Allied propaganda campaign in France, May 1940; speculation on the ability of the German population to sustain prolonged war, May 1940; reaction to the Allied withdrawals in France and Belgium, May 1940; the debate over the possible compromise peace with Germany, 26-28 May 1940; the decision to intern all enemy aliens in the United Kingdom; May 1940; Churchill's reaction to American isolationism, May 1940; the seizing of French warships in British and Egyptian harbours and the sinking of French warships at Mers-el-Kebir, Egypt, 23 Jun 1940; straining Anglo-French relations, Jul 1940; the Anglo-American 'destroyers for bases' agreement, Aug 1940; Churchill's attempt to take to court the Sunday Pictorial and the Daily Mirror over the newspapers' alleged anti-Government editorials, Oct 1940; preparations for the possible German invasion of the Britain, 1940; civil defence precautions in Britain, 1940; the British intervention in Greece, 1941; speculation on Soviet military collapses following the invasion of the Soviet Union by German armed forces, Jun 1941; Churchill's appeals to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt for American intervention in the war, 1941; reaction over the fall of Singapore and Malaya to Japanese armed forces, Feb 1942; Anglo-American preparations for the invasion of North Africa, 1942; naval and air operations against France, 1943; the 'Beveridge Report' on social security in Britain, 1943; reports on Allied conferences at Casablanca, Jan 1943, and Washington, May 1943; the Allied decision to invade France made at the QUADRANT Conference, Quebec, Canada, Aug 1943; the planning and conduct of Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of France, Jun 1944; the effect of the bombardment of London by German V1 pilotless aircraft and possible RAF reprisals against German civilian targets, Jun 1944; post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation in Europe, Jul 1944; plans for the Allied occupation of Germany and Austria, Nov 1944; British intervention in Greece in order to prevent a Communist take-over of the peninsula, Nov 1944; the establishment of the United Nations, 1945; arrangements for celebrating the end of the war in Europe, May 1945; the British General Election, Jul 1945.