Showing 41 results

Typescript transcript of interview with Werner Grossman, First Deputy to General Markus Wolf. Subjects include his role in the events of autumn 1983; the period of high tension between East and West; German Democratic Republic agents in the West; Operation RYAN, an operation of the USSR Intelligence Services initiated to prevent an atomic first strike against the Warsaw-Pact; USSRs fears of a nuclear attack; General Vladimir Kryuchkov , Head of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti/Committee for State Security (KGB); HVA as a source for the KGB; the knowledge of US Missiles in Federal Republic of Germany; the importance of Rainer Rupp, Nato Spy known as “Topaz”; Able Archer and NATO. 7pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Vladimir Kryuchkov, Head of KGB. Subjects include US & USSR policy on conflicts; Operation RYAN; KGB sharing information with GRU; Reagan’s missile launch joke; ;KGB/GRU Situations Room; registered signs of nuclear presence and monitored levels of danger; Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and Star Wars; Americans bluffing about a real war; the relationship between Kryuchkov and Andropov in the final months of Andropov’s life; Americans violating USSR airspace, the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007 and claims that Korean Airlines flight KAL 007 was a military Boeing 747 and not a civilian plane; Ronald Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech, 1981; telegrams about Kryuchkov’s concerns; American plans of aggression from sea and air; the tense period between 8-9 November 1983; Andropov and Politburo awareness of tensions; USSR’s lack of plans for conflict after World War Two and USSR retaliation had it been attacked. Original interview conducted in Russian, transcript in English 30pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Vitali Tsygichko, working in one of the Research Institutes of USSR Defence Ministry. Subjects include his role as head of mathematical modelling in Research Institute of USSR Defence Ministry, forecasting the military potential of Western countries; the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007; the concept of war exercises leading to conflict; the arrival of Pershing II missiles; USSR superiority in conventional weapons; American institute calculations of the effect of a nuclear attack on Chicago; perception of Able Archer as provocative exercise; Reagan administration benefiting from the tension; consequences of a nuclear strike; Ministry of Defence against publishing of Tsygichko’s results; Yuri Andropov’s knowledge of results; Dmitry Ustinov’s shaping of military policy; disagreements between Nikolai Orgachov and Ustinov over mathematical modelling; the Star Wars programme/Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI); calculations report in regards to Able Archer and as an annual exercise. Original interview conducted in Russian, transcript in English; 32pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Victor Cherkashin, Deputy Head of the KGB Station in Washington. Subjects include his position in 1983; Operation RYAN; the long standing possibility of nuclear attack involving the Americans and the USSR, a period of high alert; Pershing II missiles; the USSR-Afghanistan war 1979-1988; “Evil Empire” speech made by Ronald Reagan in 1981, denouncing the USSR; KGB monitoring of the White House as part of Operation RYAN; Yuri Andropov and his personal input in Operation RYAN; STAR Wars/Strategic Defence Initiative(SDI) in 1981; USSR reaction to STAR Wars; unreliability of intelligence received by the KGB in 1983; shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007, 1 Sep 1983, and the reaction from the USSR and United States; invasion of Grenada by the United States in 1983; Able Archer; relations between Europe and the United States. Original interview conducted in Russian, transcript in English. 43pp.

Typescript transcript of interview with Stanislav Petrov, USSR Early Warning System Commander. Subjects include: his role, Sep 1983, and his duties as an analyst, Ground Command and Control Centre; importance of the image of National Defence and the uniforms of the military and civilian staff; USA missile positions on his shift, in Sep 1983; how information was processed within the command and control centre; USSR preparation, both psychologically and physically, for nuclear attack; the system’s difficulty in distinguishing between light spots, satellites and missiles; false detection of missiles by their computer system. Original interview conducted in Russian, transcript in English. 55pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Sergei Lokot, USSR Nuclear Submarine Commander. Subjects include: his position in 1983 as assistant commander; his service in titanium submarines, a submarine that carried nuclear reactors; the role of titanium as a multipurpose submarine to protect the strategic submarines and destroy enemy strategic submarines; American submarines and deployment of mines underwater; the increase of anti-submarine exercises in the summer and autumn of 1983; his knowledge of Able Archer and what he was doing when it occurred; an increase in submarine presence; submarines on combat alert during Able Archer; listening devices (tap pods). Original interview conducted in Russian, typescript transcript in English 38pp.

Typescript transcript, , of interview with Robert M. Gates CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, 1983. Subjects include his role as head of analytical research in CIA and his role as chairman of the National Intelligence Council in 1983; relationship between CIA and President Ronald Reagan; how intelligence was gathered then passed on from the CIA to the administration; the role of propaganda from the CIA perspective; his recollection of the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight KAL 007 and discrepancies in the information received; whether the shooting down was intentional or not; the role of spin; increased tensions between USSR and the USA, Strategic Defence Initiative and Star Wars; killing of American military attaché in East Germany; “Evil Empire” speech by Reagan; unstable USSR leadership due to the elderly General Secretaries, Leonid Brezhnev (1969-1982), Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985); the role of Western medicine and doctors in treating the General Secretaries’ illnesses; USSR leadership knowledge of the West, based on experiences of the leaders; discrepancies between what the Politburo knew and what Andropov knew; CIA awareness of Operation RYAN; the relationship between MI6 and CIA in passing on Operation RYAN intelligence to each other; relationship between Dmitriy Ustinov,Minister of Defence for the USSR 1976-1984, and Andropov; Politburo’s role within the Communist Party; Andropov’s kidney problems and Western awareness of them by intelligence gathering; lack of intelligence analysis capability by the KGB; Beirut barracks bombing, 23 Oct 1983 and US military vulnerability; intelligence community’s lack of involvement in Able Archer (Nov 1983), monitoring of USSR response to Able Archer; USSR’s combat readiness during Able Archer; comparisons between Able Archer and Cuban Missile Crisis; concerns about Moscow reaction to Able Archer; Moscow’s response to lack of activity; United States underestimating the levels of USSR paranoia. 58pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Robert ‘Bud’ McFarlane, National Security Adviser to President Reagan. Subjects include the period of rearmament to renew the defence foundation of American National Security; tensions due to deployment of immediate range missiles, which were furthered by shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007, 1 Sep 1983; Foreign Minister of USSR, Andrei Gromyko and his understanding of the USA; USA and the launching of a first strike; the period of Detente; the engagement of dialogue with the USSR, Reagan’s refusal to continue Detente; Reagan’s animosity towards USSR since 1940s; the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD); US nuclear build up during Reagan’s first term; USSR belief in the superiority of its system; USA belief in its technical superiority despite the USSR’s wealth and investment; motivation behind the Star Wars programme; USSR fear of being seen to be making mistakes; the invasion of Grenada (Sept-Oct 1983); , informing the president about the bombing of the Beirut marine barracks in Oct 1983; world leaders involvement in Able Archer; Caspar Weinberger’s keenness to have Reagan participate; the screening of ‘The Day After’, a television drama, about nuclear fallout, broadcast on ABC in Nov 1983 and the screening at Camp David seen by Reagan; the emotional effect the The Day After had on Reagan; Reagan’s first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) meeting, deciding on the level of nuclear attack, USSR leadership in a flux; USSR’s “culture of paranoia”. 52pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Rainer Rupp NATO Senior Staff & Agent for German Democratic Republic Intelligence known as ‘Topaz’ .Subjects include his role within NATO’s political affairs division economics directorate in 1983; the role of the economics directorate; the information he was privy to in that; his roles in the North Atlantic Council and Defence Planning Council; Political Affairs division’s interest in Strategic Defence Initiative(SDI); the Current Operation Group (COG), which Rupp chaired, which looked at developments within NATO and the Current Intelligence Group (CIG), which grouped all intelligence received in the east into one central group; HVA (General Reconnaissance Administration) spy role within NATO; his membership before joining NATO ;the political situation within Germany in 1968 that lead him to become a spy; the National Democratic Party of Germany and the role of “old Nazis” in power; his recruitment into the HVA; his training prior to joining NATO; achieving his role at NATO, as an outsider; warnings to look out for surprise attacks plans by his superiors; meeting with his superiors in neutral; physiological operations within NATO against the USSR; USA and NATO searching for holes and deficiencies in the USSR system, focused on the Far East because of weaknesses; shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007, in the context of Far East division weaknesses; Russians on high alert; the possibility of NATO launching a premeditated strike against USSR; United States as a threat to USSR security; NATO’s reaction to the SS20 missiles; USSR retaliation plans; lack of information about Able Archer within NATO; the unfeasibility of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI); Europe’s scaled back nuclear arms program; relationship between the NATO member states and United States; taking photographs within NATO; providing documents and photographs to the HVA; passing over information regarding the MC161, a military committee document stating what NATO knew about the USSR; description of the biannual Wintex exercises; his knowledge of the Able Archer 1983 exercise; his use of coded machines during 1983, given to him as a response to Able Archer; transmitting messages during Able Archer; His capture and conviction in 1993; the impact his career had on the Cold War; 73pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Peter Pry, CIA Analyst. Subjects include his PHD in Strategic Studies at the University of Southern California; his political views at this time; the tension between the two superpowers; NATO deploying Pershing II missiles and USSR deploying SS20 missiles; making comparisons between Able Archer and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; the importance of the enemy’s perception and the use of intelligence analysis; USSR’s “culture of paranoia” compared to US’s ‘dysfunctional optimism’; the principle of a balance of power and global vulnerability as a result of the balance of power; Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP); Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches; Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)/Star Wars; US as a benign superpower; USSR seeing peace as a preparation for conflict due to their history; Yuri Andropov; his history, the ministers surrounding him; 1991 USSR coup d'état attempt; Operation RYAN computer; US monitoring of USSR activity; Able Archer causing increased combat readiness.101pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Oleg Kalugin, KGB General, Leningrad. Subjects include his role as second in command at the KGB in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg); working close to the Finland border; his role within the United States as an intelligence officer in the KGB, then his role as chief of Foreign counter intelligence; reforms within the KGB from 1950s-1980s ;relationship with Yuri Andropov; Kalugin’s views on Dmitriy Ustinov, and Andrei Gromyko; the rivalry between Leonid Brezhnev and his Generals with Andropov; Andropov’s ‘tough’ persona; Andropov’s survival within the USSR power infrastructure due to his perceived intellectuality; Brezhnev’s clique’s promotion of Andropov only to remove him for the KGB; Andropov’s paranoia; emergence of Operation RYAN, Ronald Reagan and his “Evil Empire” speech 1981; spotting signs of Operation RYAN, following western press reports during the early 1980s; USSR relationship with Presidents Jimmy Carter and Richard Nixon during Detente; USSR’s relationship with Henry Kissinger; the monitoring of the White House and Western Europe by KGB intelligence officers, the cynicism felt by officers about Operation RYAN; head of KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, his anti-western views, his relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev and Kryuchkov’s role in the failed 1991 USSR coup d'état attempt; Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, May 1945; The USSR economy; shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight KAL 007, 1 Sep 1983; the presence of Operation RYAN; USSR ageing leadership. 61pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Oleg Gordievsky, KGB Colonel, London and Moscow and Double Agent working for British Intelligence. Subjects include Operation RYAN, with reference to the KGB; cynicism by junior officers of Operation RYAN; why Operation RYAN began in 1981; concerns about Ronald Reagan and American determination from USSR intelligence; increased suspicion amongst all the Warsaw Pact intelligence; USSR reaction to Reagan’s ideological speeches including his “Evil Empire” speech ;the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007, 1 Sep 1983 and the reaction to the shooting down; Communication between USSR and United States regarding KAL 007-1 Sep 1983; Gordievsky’s role as a double agent and information passed to the British; his meetings with John Scarlet, MI6 officer; Yuri Andropov’s attitudes to communism and the spirit of USSR aggression disappearing throughout the 1980s, how the illness of Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary 1984-1985, changed the atmosphere of the USSR; Moscow reaction to the invasion of Grenada, Oct-Dec 1983, by the United States; tension after Able Archer exercise; lack of nuclear strikes between the USA and USSR during the Cold War; comparison between Able Archer and Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962; the belief of the USSR that Reagan wanted a nuclear war; Gordievsky’s escape from the USSR in 1985. 56pp.

Typescript transcript of interview with Lord Charles Powell, Foreign Policy Adviser to British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher 1979-1991. Subjects include 1983 within the context of Cold War tensions; Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan’s hard line approach to the USSR ; the belief that USSR were trying advance communism throughout the world; the pursuit of Detente; overestimation of USSR’s economic status by the West and Western intelligence; the determination of Thatcher and Reagan to defeat communism; defensive nature of the USSR leadership; Thatcher’s influence over Reagan though it was a meeting of minds; Reagan’s vision of ridding the world of nuclear weapons and Thatcher’s belief that no nuclear weapons in the world was impracticable; Reagan’s 1987 meeting with Mikhail Gorbachov in Reykjavík; Gorbachov’s refusal to let Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) continue; Early 1980s as low point for USSR and West communication due to the quick succession of Communist Party secretaries; SDI as a defensive measure; British Foreign and Defence ministry opposition to SDI , Thatcher’s support of SDI and the conditions of her support; Thatcher’s support of dialogue with Gorbachov and her work with the next generation of USSR leadership; Thatcher’s reactions to the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007 and the British viewing the shooting down as a mistake; USSR paranoia and response to British and American reaction; Thatcher’s indignation at the invasion of Grenada as there was lack of consultation or warning from Reagan; Thatcher’s concerns about international law; the likelihood of the USSR making the first nuclear strike; Powell’s meeting with Andre Gromyko; Powell’s recollections of Able Archer and Thatcher’s non role in Able Archer; intelligence into USSR leadership; the role of Oleg Gordievsky as a MI6 source within the KGB, initial reaction to Andropov becoming General Secretary. 33pp

Typescript transcript of interview, with John Hughes Wilson, NATO Colonel and Author. Subjects include the idea behind the Able Archer exercise; what the WINTEX exercise was; NATO forces deployed during the command post exercise; the testing of communications and new equipment in Able Archer; how exercises were seen by officers of NATO; the role of the Supreme Allied Commander (SACR) in Able Archer in collaboration with the Military Committee and the Defence Planning Committee; the length of Able Archer exercises; the concept of “the third cold war”, tensions during this period, in particular the political tensions; Beirut barracks bombing, Oct 1983; the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007; coming up with potential scenarios for NATO exercises; why did Able Archer’83 cause USSR particular concern compared to other NATO exercises; the belief that Able Archer was a cover for a real nuclear attack and Able Archer intimidating the USSR; KGB and GRU awareness of exercise; the use of conventional warfare in a NATO exercise scenario; the strategy being based on Warsaw Pact and NATO man power; the level of civilian involvement; the imminent deployment of Pershing II missiles and the USSR’s concerns; NATO’s response to the USSR deployment of SS20s; USSR use of Rainer Rupp (‘Topaz’) , spy within NATO; the impact of psychological operations; USSR analysis of signals traffic; what is known now about USSR reaction to Able Archer; NATO as a defensive organisation; the secrecy surrounding Able Archer; description of SHAPE, as a building and the atmosphere within it.52pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Joe Troxell, Staff Officer, SHAPE. Subjects include the Able Archer exercise his role in Able Archer and how it increased the confidence of staff unfamiliar with procedure, the value and importance of the exercise; description of facilities at SHAPE and atmosphere within SHAPE bunker; tensions between NATO countries; Able Archer concerns of West Germany; the possible use of pre-emptive strike by NATO; what did the USSR know about Able Archer; psychological operations in military and politics, particularly Grenada and Able Archer; USSR response to Ronald Reagan and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI); Able Archer as a provocative exercise. 67pp

Typescript transcript of interview with Gennady Ossipovich, USSR Fighter Pilot, Far East Section [the Pilot who shot down civilian flight KAL 007]. Subjects include his role as deputy regiment commander stationed on Sakhalin Island; the violation of USSR air space by American reconnaissance planes; shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007; situations in when a passenger plane could legitimately be shot down; the awareness that it was a Boeing 474 passenger plane, deviated 700km from its route, the lack of faces seen by Ossipovich; the possibility that Korean Airlines flight KAL 007 didn’t see the gun fire; the emotion and determination behind shooting down a plane; authorities keeping their distance from Ossipovich; warning signals sent to Korean Airlines flight KAL 007; ground control message to KAL 007; recording fake evidence after the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007, using an electric razor; the findings of the submarine that investigated the crash, rumours surrounding the incident; Original interview conducted in Russian, transcript in English 31pp