Microfilm collection containing copies of meeting minutes of the major conferences of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1941-1945. Meeting minutes include those for the conference held at Washington, DC, codenamed ARCADIA, at which Anglo-American planners first formed a combined strategy for the prosecution of the war, 22 Dec 1941-14 Jan 1942; the conference at Casablanca, Morocco, codenamed SYMBOL, during which the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) first discussed the policies of German unconditional surrender, the Combined Bomber Offensive from Great Britain against Germany and the establishment of the French National Committee for Liberation, 14-24 Jan 1943; the Allied conference held at Washington, DC, codenamed TRIDENT, at which President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Prime Minister Rt Hon Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS)discussed the decision to delay the invasion of France until May 1944, the Italian surrender, and the Battle of the Atlantic, 11-25 May 1943; the Allied conference at Quebec City, Canada, codenamed QUADRANT, at which the Allies endorsed a plan for the invasion of the Normandy coast in France, formed a new theatre of war, South-East Asia Command, with Acting Adm Lord Louis (Francis Albert Victor Nicholas) Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander, and regulated the procedures for co-operation between Great Britain and the US regarding the development and production of the atomic bomb, 12-24 Aug 1943; the Allied conferences at Cairo, Egypt, codenamed SEXTANT, at which the Allies discussed combined operations in South-East Asia with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese forces, 22-26 Nov and 2-7 Dec 1943; the Allied conference at Teheran, Iran, codenamed EUREKA, during which the Allies first co-ordinated future strategy with Soviet Prime Minister Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, including plans to coincide military operations against Germany in France and the Soviet Union in May 1944, 28-30 Nov 1943; the conference at Quebec City, Canada, codenamed OCTAGON, at which the Allies discussed the post-war division of Germany and a plan for its de-industrialisation, 12-16 Sep 1944; the conferences at Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union, codenamed ARGONAUT, at which the Allies discussed the division of post-war Germany, the occupation of Germany and Austria, Soviet involvement in the war against Japan, and the future government and frontiers of Poland, 30 Jan-9 Feb 1945; the conference at Potsdam, Germany, codenamed TERMINAL, during which surrender terms for Japan were discussed, the boundaries and peace terms for Europe were determined and Poland's government and frontiers were debated, 16 Jul-2 Aug 1945. Conference minutes include references to Allied production and assignment of war materials; British and US merchant vessel losses; US policy concerning assignments of Lend-Lease military aircraft, naval vessels and munitions to Great Britain; Allied petroleum supplies; propaganda and unconventional warfare; war crimes and prisoners of war; operational reports concerning the planning and conduct of Allied offensive operations in Europe, including the invasion of North Africa, codenamed Operation TORCH, Nov 1942; the invasion of Sicily, Italy, codenamed Operation HUSKY, Jul 1943; the US preparation for the invasion of Europe, codenamed Operation BOLERO; and the Allied invasion of Europe, codenamed Operation OVERLORD, Jun 1944; operational reports concerning the Japanese war economy; Japanese Imperial Army logistical capabilities; locations and strengths of Japanese forces in the Pacific; British participation in long range bombing of Japan; Allied operational efforts in Burma, India, Malaya, and the Philippines; Soviet claims on the Sakhalin and Kuril islands; the co-ordination of Allied strategic plans for the defeat and occupation of Japan, 1943-1944; Soviet military action to facilitate Operation OVERLORD; liaison between Allied theatre commanders and the Soviet Army; Soviet capabilities with reference to the Far East; US Lend-Lease requirements for the Soviet Union; and estimates of Soviet post-war capabilities and intentions, 1943-1945.

The Soviet Estimate: US Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 is a themed microfilm collection which presents an integrated record of US intelligence estimates and studies relating to Soviet strategic projections, military capabilities, science and technology, economics and internal politics, 1946-1991. The estimates and studies were produced either collectively as national intelligence products or by individual agencies, and include contributions from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Director of Central Intelligence; the US Defense Intelligence Agency; and, the US State Department. The collection includes CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service debriefing transcripts of former Soviet Gavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (GRU), Chief Intelligence Directorate, Soviet General Staff, operative Oleg V Penkovskii, relating to Soviet military organisation and plans for nuclear war, Soviet nuclear targets and deployments in Europe, missile technology and launch sites, Soviet military personnel, the capture of Capt Francis Gary Powers, US Air Force U-2 High Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft pilot, 1 May 1960, profiles of Soviet military officers, locations of Soviet nuclear weapons tests, Soviet intelligence organisations and Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs, Soviet development and deployment of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), positions of Soviet divisions in East Germany, and the Berlin Crisis (1958- 1962), 20 Apr-14 Oct 1961; yearly US estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities, 1947- 1983, including the 'missile gap' National Intelligence Estimates, 1957-1961; detailed estimates of the Soviet space program, including National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) relating to lunar exploration, manned space flight, reconnaissance satellites, space exploration, space weapons and weapons development, 1962-1967; US Air Force report entitled 'A History of Strategic Arms Competition: Volume 3, A Handbook of Selected Soviet Weapons and Space Systems', including data relating to Soviet air to surface missiles (AS), Tupolev bomber aircraft, M-4 / Mya-4 / 2M Myasishchev ('Bison') aircraft, space weapons, communication satellites, electronic intelligence capabilities, surface to surface (SS) theatre missiles and ICBMs, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Jun 1976; US intelligence community experiment in competitive analysis conducted by the CIA 'B Team' relating to US misperceptions of Soviet strategic objectives and offensive and defensive forces, Dec 1976; report from the US Department of State entitled 'History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945-1972, parts 1 and 2', including detailed surveys and analyses of Soviet and US decision making on nuclear forces, force deployments, and nuclear strategies, Mar 1981; Special National Intelligence Estimate relating to Soviet support for international terrorism and revolutionary activities, including mention of arms transfers, military training, political violence, and terrorist activities in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, May 1981; reports from the CIA concerning Soviet perspectives on research and development in energy-directed weapons and involvement in space weapons and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research, 1985; National Intelligence Estimates relating to General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's prospects for reforming the Soviet economic and political system, including mention of his economic agenda and its implications for the Soviet military program, the dynamics of Soviet civil-military relations, the impact of reforms on labour production, health, standards of living and technological development, and the rise of civil unrest and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1985- 1989; CIA report concerning the probabilities of a coup d'etat in the Soviet Union and the growing influence of Chairman of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, May 1991.