Public Statements by the Secretaries of Defense, 1947-1981 are microfilmed copies of official statements, press releases, speeches, announcements and memoranda released by successive US Secretaries of Defense, 1947-1981. Compiled by the US Department of Defense at the Pentagon, Washington, DC, the material reflects US government national security concerns during the height of the Cold War. Arranged chronologically, the series includes statement before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), 1948; statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on aid to Greece and Turkey, 1948; memoranda relating to Civil Defense Planning, 1948; statement on biological warfare potentialities, 1949; statements relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949-1981; remarks at the unveiling of the memorial to British FM Sir John (Greer) Dill, 1950; testimony relating to the military situation in the Far East and the Balkans; statements relating to the Mutual Security Pact, 1952 and the Mutual Security Program, 1953; statement regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons for air defence, 1957; statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services relating to satellite and missile programs, 1958; testimony regarding the Foreign Assistance Act, 1962; press conferences relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; joint statements with Gen Maxwell Davenport Taylor, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to the situation in the Republic of Vietnam, 1963; press conference regarding Gulf of Tonkin 'incident', 1964; statement regarding the appointment of Gen William Childs Westmoreland as Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1964; press releases relating to the increased commitment of US ground troops to Vietnam, 1966; testimony regarding US operations in Cambodia, 1970; press conferences relating to US-Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) tests, 1970; statements regarding US arms sales to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 1974; statements regarding the fall of Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, to the North Vietnamese Army, Apr 1975; testimony relating to nuclear technology, including the Minuteman II nuclear missile, 1976; statements regarding Stealth technology and its application, 1980.

The Papers of the President's Science Advisory Committee, 1957-1961 are microfilmed copies of meeting minutes, correspondence, agenda, scientific reports and studies from the President's Science Advisory Committee (PASC), 1957-1961. The records of the PASC in the Eisenhower administration detail science policy, 1957-1961, primarily relating to arms control and disarmament through nuclear power; space; medical research; and particle physics. The PASC records include minutes and agenda from PASC's regular monthly meetings; minutes from the annual meetings with Eisenhower, compiled by PASC Executive Officer David Beckler; reports, speeches, studies and correspondence relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Space Project, US Strategic Air Command; satellite communications; nuclear testing; nuclear propulsion; early warning defence systems; US and Soviet biological and chemical warfare capabilities; US aircraft development, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Lunar Program; ocean surveillance projects; the Television Infrared Observation Satellite Program; the Apollo lunar Program; US anti-submarine warfare capabilities; Soviet scientific progress, 1957-1961; US missile programs and radar and radio astronomy advancements. Microfilm also includes correspondence and memoranda between PASC and Eisenhower; Emanuael Piore, PASC consultant and research director for IBM; Alan Waterman, President of the National Science Foundation; Senator Henry M Jackson; and presidential adviser Gen Andrew Jackson Goodpaster.

Microfilm copies of official US government reports and US military, scientific, academic and policy journals relating to nuclear weapons, arms control, weapons technology, deterrence, nuclear strategy, and US foreign policy, 1919-1995. The reports have been arranged chronologically and include material relating to non-proliferation treaty safeguards; civil defence in the United States; deterrence theory; analyses of the Soviet Military Industrial Complex; interview transcripts of US government officials associated with weapons systems development and deployment; qualitative and quantitative analyses of the US-Soviet arms race; analyses of the theory of flexible response; nuclear capabilities of the People's Republic of China; North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) missile warning systems, 1968-1981; the Joint Cruise Missiles Project, 1982; the Tonopah Test Range technical manual, 1982; the planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) nuclear deterrent for the 1980s and 1990s; French and British nuclear forces in the 1980s and 1990s; the evolution of US and NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and limited nuclear war options, the Strategic Defense Initiative Program (SDI); trends in anti-nuclear protests in the US; US National Security Policy, 1980s; the threat of nuclear terrorism; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; anti-satellite weaponry; the threat of biological and chemical weapons. Official US government reports include report to the US Congress relating to stockpile reliability, weapons re-manufacture, and the role of nuclear testing, 1987; report to the US Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1989; Nevada Test Site Annual Site Environmental Report, 1989; report on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), including the text of the treaty and a number of related documents and protocols, 1991; the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 1993; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report to the US Congress, 1994; US Department of Energy reports relating to the disposal and storage of fissile materials, 1995.

The US Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968 microfilm collection presents an integrated record of US decision making relating to the development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, 1955-1968. Documents are generated from a number of sources including the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Air Force, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Strategic Air Command, the Executive Office of the President, US National Security Council, and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Material relating to early US policy planning and decisions on thermonuclear weapons includes relevance studies by the RAND Corporation, a US non-partisan government policy guidance institution, 1952; memoranda from the Office of the White House relating to nuclear weapons stockpiles and projections, 1959; and, memoranda from the US Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission relating to underground and atmospheric nuclear testing, 1959-62. Papers relating to nuclear weapons development, acquisition and testing include memoranda from Gen Curtis E LeMay, Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Air Command, relating to increased budgetary needs for the proposed nuclear build-up, Jan 1956; memorandum from Gen Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, Defense Liaison Officer and Staff Secretary to the President, relating to the concept of 'massive retaliation' in the event of a Soviet first-strike, May 1956; memorandum from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to emergency war plans, nuclear strategy, and preventive war, Sep 1956; memorandum from the Gen Lyman L Lemnitzer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to US doctrine on thermonuclear attack, Apr 1961; memorandum from the US Department of Defense to President John Fitzgerald Kennedy relating to scenarios for US and Soviet first-strikes, Oct 1961; memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara to the Office of the Secretary, US Army, relating to nuclear damage limitation and 'assured destruction'. Papers relating to nuclear strategy and planning include memoranda concerning the applicability of Soviet cities as targets of US nuclear attack; the US Strategic Air Command Basic War Plan, [Feb 1960]; papers relating to target co-ordination and planning for a functional Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 1960-1961; papers on 'war-gaming', net evaluation exercises of US capabilites in the event of a general nuclear war with the Soviet Union, including memoranda from Robert R Bowie, Director of US State Department Policy Planning Staff, concerning Soviet capabilities to inflict direct damage on the US, 1953-1967. Material relating to air, land and sea nuclear delivery systems, missile deployments, alert programs, and defence appropriations include memoranda from Goodpaster concerning Eisenhower's endorsement plans for missile program acceleration and for upgrading US Strategic Air Command capabilities, 1957; memoranda from the President's Science Advisory Committee relating to the construction of civil defence structures and missile deployments, 1958; report from the US Department of Defense, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, reviewing US weapons systems and directly-related functions which constitute the strategic offensive posture of the US 1964-1967; press statements and memoranda from US Secretary of Defence McNamara relating to the doctine of 'assured destruction', defence appropriations, and weapons development, 1961-66; US National Security Briefings on strategic intelligence, Soviet capabilities for strategic attack, anti-missile and air defence, and economic trends, 1963. Papers relating to nuclear strategy, planning, weapons and delivery systems in the European theatre include reports regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's strategy for nuclear war, 1954-1969; the deployment of Chrysler 'Jupiter' PGM-19 IRBMs in Western Europe; the establishment of the Douglas 'Thor' PGM-17 IRBM program in Great Britain, 1956-1963; the escalation of US-Soviet hostilies in Berlin, 1961; reports concerning British co-operation with with US Strategic Air Command; speech by US Secretary of State McNamara, in Athens, Greece, relating to US assurances to its European allies in the event of a general war, 1962. Papers relating to nuclear warning and defence include reports from the US Department of State concerning the immediate construction of a Distant Early Warning (DEW) system in Canada and Alaska, 1952-1953; reports from the President's Science Advisory Committee, including studies of civil defence measures in the event of a nuclear attack, 1957-1958; reports from the US Department of State regarding the construction of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) in the United Kingdom, 1958; memoranda from the North American Aerospace Command (NORAD), relating to nuclear pre- emption and tactical warnings, 1958-1959; reports from the President's Science Advisory Committee's Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Panel, 1958-1959; papers from the President's Science Advisory Committee and the US Department of Defense relating to the construction and deployment of Bell Laboratory Nike-Zeus and Nike X Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs) in the US, Canada, and Western Europe, 1959-1968.

The Soviet Estimate: US Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 is a themed microfilm collection which presents an integrated record of US intelligence estimates and studies relating to Soviet strategic projections, military capabilities, science and technology, economics and internal politics, 1946-1991. The estimates and studies were produced either collectively as national intelligence products or by individual agencies, and include contributions from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Director of Central Intelligence; the US Defense Intelligence Agency; and, the US State Department. The collection includes CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service debriefing transcripts of former Soviet Gavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (GRU), Chief Intelligence Directorate, Soviet General Staff, operative Oleg V Penkovskii, relating to Soviet military organisation and plans for nuclear war, Soviet nuclear targets and deployments in Europe, missile technology and launch sites, Soviet military personnel, the capture of Capt Francis Gary Powers, US Air Force U-2 High Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft pilot, 1 May 1960, profiles of Soviet military officers, locations of Soviet nuclear weapons tests, Soviet intelligence organisations and Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs, Soviet development and deployment of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), positions of Soviet divisions in East Germany, and the Berlin Crisis (1958- 1962), 20 Apr-14 Oct 1961; yearly US estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities, 1947- 1983, including the 'missile gap' National Intelligence Estimates, 1957-1961; detailed estimates of the Soviet space program, including National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) relating to lunar exploration, manned space flight, reconnaissance satellites, space exploration, space weapons and weapons development, 1962-1967; US Air Force report entitled 'A History of Strategic Arms Competition: Volume 3, A Handbook of Selected Soviet Weapons and Space Systems', including data relating to Soviet air to surface missiles (AS), Tupolev bomber aircraft, M-4 / Mya-4 / 2M Myasishchev ('Bison') aircraft, space weapons, communication satellites, electronic intelligence capabilities, surface to surface (SS) theatre missiles and ICBMs, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Jun 1976; US intelligence community experiment in competitive analysis conducted by the CIA 'B Team' relating to US misperceptions of Soviet strategic objectives and offensive and defensive forces, Dec 1976; report from the US Department of State entitled 'History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945-1972, parts 1 and 2', including detailed surveys and analyses of Soviet and US decision making on nuclear forces, force deployments, and nuclear strategies, Mar 1981; Special National Intelligence Estimate relating to Soviet support for international terrorism and revolutionary activities, including mention of arms transfers, military training, political violence, and terrorist activities in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, May 1981; reports from the CIA concerning Soviet perspectives on research and development in energy-directed weapons and involvement in space weapons and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research, 1985; National Intelligence Estimates relating to General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's prospects for reforming the Soviet economic and political system, including mention of his economic agenda and its implications for the Soviet military program, the dynamics of Soviet civil-military relations, the impact of reforms on labour production, health, standards of living and technological development, and the rise of civil unrest and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1985- 1989; CIA report concerning the probabilities of a coup d'etat in the Soviet Union and the growing influence of Chairman of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, May 1991.

Papers collected or created by Menaul, 1950-1986, principally comprising journal articles, press cuttings, US and UK government and defence industry press releases and public relations pamphlets relating to nuclear weapons, 1962-1985, including the politics and doctrine of nuclear strategy and deterrence, Cruise, Pershing and Polaris missiles, and the research and development of nuclear delivery systems; to arms control, 1973-1985, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) 1 and 2; to ballistic missile defence, 1974-1986, including anti-satellite weapons and the High Frontier and High Frontier Europe organisations; to US, Soviet and European space programmes, 1976-1986; to land, sea and air weapons systems and warfare, 1973-1984; to defence budgets and arms procurement, the international arms industry, global strategy, collective security and NATO strategy, 1967-1986; to military technology, 1967-1986, including the comparative capabilities of Western and Soviet technology, chemical and biological warfare, electronic warfare, and the military uses of lasers and radar; to the study and history of warfare, 1970-1984, including the principles and morality of warfare and the history of the RAF; to national and international defence issues, multilateral agreements and military actions, 1969-1986; manuscript, proof, reviews and correspondence relating to Countdown: Britain's strategic nuclear forces (Hale, London, 1980), [1976-1981]; unpublished manuscripts by Menaul, 1969, [1972], [1978-1979], 1987; audiocassette recordings of radio interviews with Menaul, 1979-[1983]; copies of journals to which Menaul contributed, 1969-1985; papers relating to or generated by organisations and companies of which Menaul was a member or with which he was associated, 1966-1985, including Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (formerly Royal United Service Institution), Centre for Policy Studies, Stanford Research Institute and Hughes Aircraft Company; correspondence and published papers relating to conferences on foreign policy and defence issues, 1970-1986; personal and business correspondence, 1956-1987, notably with Gen Sir Walter Walker, 1968-1987, Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 1976-1984, and Aims for Freedom and Enterprise, 1976-1986; personal papers, 1950-1959, 1971, 1973, [1978-1987], including newspaper cuttings relating to Menaul's RAF career, 1950-1959, notably his command of the British Atomic Trials Task Forces, Monte Bello and Maralinga, Australia, 1955-1956.

The collection presents an integrated record of US decision making during the 1962 nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Much of the documentation focuses on the period from Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy's 16 Oct 1962 briefing of President Kennedy on the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba to Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's 28 Oct 1962 decision to withdraw the weapons. Papers include intelligence reports, diplomatic cables, political analyses, military situation reports, and meeting minutes relating to the immediate backdrop to the crisis, the crisis (16 Oct-28 Oct 1962), and its aftermath. Papers concerning the background to the crisis relate to US attempts to overthrow Cuban Prime Minister Dr Fidel Castro following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Apr 1961; US and Soviet nuclear capabilities and doctrine in the early 1960s; the deployment of US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to forward bases in Europe; and the concern over the resurgence of Soviet military aid to Cuba in the summer of 1962. Papers relating to the crisis include US intelligence reports confirming the construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba; National Security Council minutes relating to a potential invasion of Cuba by US conventional forces, possible US air attacks against Cuba and the resultant Cuban casualties, the possibility of imposing an economic blockade around Cuba, the maintenance of US U-2 High Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft flights over Cuba, and the possibility of Soviet retaliatory military actions against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states in the event of US attacks on Cuba, 16 Oct 1962; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) daily intelligence reports concerning Soviet missile bases and possible Soviet surface to surface SS-4 ('Sandal') nuclear missiles in Cuba; reports from the UN Security Council and General Assembly from the US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Ewing Stevenson; meetings between Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Andreevich Gromyko; US estimates of Cuban ground forces; articles from Soviet news agency TASS denouncing American motives in Cuba; reports from US Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara regarding the possible withdrawal of US missile bases in Italy and Turkey in exchange for Soviet withdrawals from Cuba; discussions of the possible US 'Naval Quarantine' of Cuba; CIA estimates relating to possible Soviet first strike military capability with missiles in Cuba; NSC reports relating to the construction of IRBM and Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) bases in Guanajay and San Cristóbal, Cuba, 21 Oct 1962; President Kennedy's announcement to world heads of state regarding the US 'Naval Quarantine' of Cuba (24 Oct-20 Nov 1962) to prevent further Soviet arms shipments of offensive weapons and development of further missile bases, 23 Oct 1962; message from Khrushchev to Kennedy stating that the US 'Naval Quarantine' is an act of aggression against both Cuba and the Soviet Union, 23 Oct 1962; statements by US Ambassador Stevenson, Cuban Ambassador Mario Garcia Incháustegui, and Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in the UN Security Council, 23 Oct 1962; documents relating to the operational readiness of US continental nuclear forces; minutes from UN Security Council meeting, 25 Oct 1962; letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy suggesting that the Soviet Union would withdraw missile bases in return for a US 'non-invasion commitment' towards Cuba, 26 Oct 1962; negotiations over verification of the Soviet missile withdrawal; the US non-invasion 'guarantee' to Cuba and the Soviet Union; and, the question of Soviet Ilyushin IL-28 ('Beagle') bombers and troops remaining in Cuba. The collection also includes retrospective studies of the missile crisis, including the US Department of State internal history of the crisis, US Department of Defense comprehensive reports describing the actions of military commands and units during the missile crisis, and US government records relating to the US-Soviet rapprochement developed in the 1970s and 1980